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RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE 
STANDARDIZATION OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY
BY JASON BELMONT CONN
“The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean 
only one thing -- one person, one vote.”
-- Chief Justice Earl Warren (1963)1
INTRODUCTION: AMBIGUITIES WITHOUT ANSWERS
On November 3, 2004,2 Senator John Kerry conceded the presidential election to 
President George W. Bush,3 and the nation exhaled a deep sigh of relief that the presidential 
election would not end in another lengthy and contentious legal battle like the one that cast a 
dark cloud over the 2000 presidential election.4  Although his decision to forgo litigation helped 
unify a politically divided nation in the wake of a contentious election cycle,5 Kerry also closed 
the door on a judicial dissection of the balloting process and a potential opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to revisit many of the lingering questions from its controversial and tangled 
 A.B. 2003, summa cum laude, Cornell University; J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Michigan 
Law School.  Mr. Conn is Executive Articles Editor of the Michigan Journal of Race & Law.  Mr. 
Conn would like to thank Professor Ellen D. Katz at Michigan Law and Professor Walter Mebane at 
Cornell University for their helpful comments.
1 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
2
 The election was held on November 2, 2004.  However, as Americans went to sleep that night, the 
election was still too close to call given the close margins of victory in a number of key states.  See
Tracy Grant, Election Is Too Close to Call, WASHINGTON POST, C15, Nov. 3, 2004.
3 See Nagourney, Bush Voices Pride, Humility and Optimism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004.
4 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Jeffrey Toobin, TOO CLOSE TO CALL: THE THIRTY-SIX-DAY 
BATTLE TO DECIDE THE 2000 ELECTION (2001); Alan M. Dershowitz, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE 
HIGH COURT HIJACKED THE NATION (2000); Richard A. Posner, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 
ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001).
5
 Senator Kerry said: “In America, it is vital that every vote count . . . But the outcome should be 
decided by voters, not a protracted legal fight.”  Charles Hurt, As Night Wore On, Glee Became 
Gloom, WASHINGTON TIMES, A11, Nov. 4, 2004.
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decision in Bush v. Gore.6
In this article, I examine one of these lingering questions: Does Bush v. Gore and the 
relevant equal protection case law open the door for an equal protection challenge to a state’s use 
of different voting machines/technologies and how do the racial disparities in error rates impact 
this analysis?7  As we reflect on the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education,8 and the 
fortieth anniversary of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,9 and legal scholars continue to debate the 
lessons, value, and legacy of these landmark accomplishments of the civil rights movement, it 
seems particularly important to continue scrutinizing our electoral process to ensure that all 
Americans are not only given equal access to the ballot, but also an opportunity to uniformly 
impact who is elected to serve as our representatives.  Standardization of voting technologies at 
6 See Hurt, supra note 5.  A group of prominent House Democrats, including Rep. John Conyers of 
Michigan, strongly objected to the counting of Ohio’s electoral votes in the 2004 election and 
encouraged legal challenges.  See Amy Fagan, Kerry Rebuffs Protest of Ohio Electors, WASHINGTON 
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005.
7
 Following Bush v. Gore, one scholar published a self-proclaimed “short Essay” in 2001 noting the 
“significance of the racial disparities reflected in machine-rejected ballots.”  Given developments in 
the case law and political science data regarding these disparities since 2001, this issue deserves 
greater scrutiny.  See Spencer Overton, Symposium: The Law of Presidential Elections: Issues in the 
Wake of Florida 2000: A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 FLA. ST. 
U.L. REV. 469 (2001).
8
 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I]; see, e.g., Genna Rae McNeil, Essay: Before Brown: 
Reflections On Historical Context and Vision, 52 AM. U.L. REV. 1431 (2003); Honorable Robert M. 
Bell, Chief Judge, Ct. of Apps. of MD, Speech: Journey To Justice: Fiftieth Anniversary of Brown v. 
Board of Education, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (2004); Ronald S. Sullivan Jr., Multiple Ironies: Brown 
at 50, 47 HOW. L.J. 29 (2003).
9
 Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1973 
(2000)); see Karyn L. Bass, Note & Comment, Are We Really Over the Hill Yet? The Voting Rights 
Act at Forty Years: Actual and Constructive Disenfranchisement in the Wake of Election 2000 and 
Bush v. Gore, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 111 (2004).
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the state-level is central to accomplishing this goal.10
Given the current partisan political divide in the country,11 the documented closeness of 
recent elections at all governmental levels,12 and the recognized impact that a single vote or 
single jurisdiction’s returns can have on our national elections,13 the Court should strictly apply 
“one person, one vote” to the jurisprudence on election machines.  Whereas the courts have been 
willing to scrutinize reapportionment plans to ensure that electoral districts are unexceptionally 
even,14 the courts have largely looked the other way when confronted with one of the largest
threats to the ideal that every person’s vote counts equally: Errors in voting machine technology
10
 According to Election Data Services, “Over the years, several states have moved to establish 
uniform voting  systems. Oklahoma led the way by establishing a uniform optical scan voting system 
in the early 1990s. Delaware’s three counties have used electronic systems since 1996. Hawaii and 
Rhode Island established uniform optical scan systems in 1998. Georgia established a uniform 
electronic voting system in 2002.  Nevada will establish a uniform electronic voting system in 2004; 
Maryland, in 2006. Although Maryland’s uniform system won’t be fully implemented until 2006, all 
24 election jurisdictions, including the city of Baltimore, are expected to use some type of electronic 
system in 2004.” “New Study Shows 50 Million Voters Will Use Electronic Voting Systems, 32 
Million Still with Punch Cards in 2004,” Election Data Services, Press Release, available at
http://www.electiondataservices.com/content/votingequipment.htm.
11
 For example, in 2000, the United States had the closest presidential election in the modern history 
of the Electoral College.  On election night, the national news media first declared Vice President Al 
Gore the winner, only to extract the prediction a few hours later.  Eventually, George W. Bush would 
be declared the winner, but only after five weeks of legal debates, recounts, and political mayhem.  
The 2000 election was the first time in over 100 years that the candidate who won the Electoral 
College and the election, was not the candidate that won the popular vote.  See Jeffrey Toobin, TOO 
CLOSE TO CALL (2001).  The 2000 and 2004 election showed that there is currently no overwhelming 
mandate for either party’s political platform.
12 See Jason Belmont Conn, The Partisan Politics of Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement Laws (2003) 
(unpublished undergraduate honors thesis, Cornell University), at 58, available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/connfvr.pdf.
13 See Tim Jones & Andrew Zajac, Vote Ordeal for Ohio Begins, Ends in the Dark, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE, C12, Nov. 3, 2004; see also Chris McGann, Gregoire Sworn In Amid Legal Challenge, 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 13, 2005, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/207695_governor13.html (discussing the closeness of the 2004 
Washington State Governor’s race).
14 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); for a discussion of the court’s entrance into the 
“political thicket” of reapportionment and gerrymandering, see Daniel R. Ortiz, Symposium, The 
Law of Democracy: Redistricting: Case Law and Consequences: Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
459 (2004).
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compromising one’s vote do not strike evenly across type of voting machine, and the error rates 
within a state often correlate with race and socioeconomic status.
The Supreme Court hinted in Bush v. Gore that it wanted Congress and the state 
legislatures to address the problems associated with varying voting technology,15 but it is time 
for the Supreme Court to hand down a mandate and force each state to use the same voting 
technology.16  This article suggests that one legacy and lesson of Brown v. Board of Education17
is that giving the nation’s legislatures leeway to rectify serious constitutional inadequacies “with 
all deliberate speed” is a formula for failure; the court must mandate change.18  In mandating 
standardization, the Court will protect “one person, one vote” and ensure voting equality across 
race.
15 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (“After the current counting, it is likely legislative bodies nationwide 
will examine ways to improve the mechanisms and machinery for voting”).
16
 The argument in this paper focuses on standardization at the state level, as opposed to national 
standardization.  States have always had the power to regulate elections.  Given the individualities of 
elections in each state, a single type of machine might not work for every state.  Because electoral 
districts are apportioned based on census data and not the number of people voting, a state would not 
lose any congressional seats because a higher percentage of their population was disenfranchised 
through machine errors.  Furthermore, because we have an Electoral College voting system, and the 
popular vote is meaningless in presidential elections, disparities in error rate would not impact a 
state’s influence on the presidential election.  In other words, many of the “one person, one vote”
arguments discussed in this paper would be cured by standardization at the state level, and there 
would be no extra benefits from nationwide standardization in terms of one’s statistical impact on an 
election.  Furthermore, the nation might benefit from varying technologies in different states because 
there would be an incentive for companies to develop more accurate machinery, thus winning 
additional state contracts.  Ideally, machines will some day have a zero percent error rate.  This day is 
far off, but national standardization might not encourage the development of new technologies.  Of 
course, these arguments all revolve around the practical impact of one’s vote and not the abstract 
value of having one’s vote counted, thus some of the arguments in this paper could certainly suggest 
that nationwide standardization is the only constitutional system.
17
 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18 See Philip Elman, Colloquy: Response, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1949 (1987); Michael A. Berch, 
Symposium, We’ve Only Just Begun: The Impact of Remand Orders from Higher to Lower Courts on 
American Jurisprudence, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 493 (2004).
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SYLLABUS
Thus far this article has suggested that the quick resolution of the 2004 presidential 
election helped unify the nation and did not provide a forum in which the courts could review 
and clarify the Supreme Court’s controversial and factionalized decision in Bush v. Gore.19
PART I examines the current state of voting technology in the United States and argues that 
statewide variation in technology is problematic in a democracy.  PART II of this article explores, 
albeit briefly given the large amount of litigation in this area, the Supreme Court’s “one person, 
one vote” standard that has been used as a template for reviewing election laws and disparate 
treatment at the ballot box, and argues that using voting machines with different error rates is a 
violation of this standard.  PART III demonstrates that the worst machines in a state are often 
found in districts with a large proportion of racial minorities and economically disadvantaged 
areas, suggesting that the racial impact of the variation should elevate the level of scrutiny the 
use of these machines receives.  Although this article is primarily concerned with the impact of 
Bush v. Gore, PART IV briefly examines the possibility of a Voting Rights Act challenge to 
voting machines.  PART V examines some of the key law suits that have been brought since Bush 
v. Gore challenging the use of disparate voting machines. PART VI draws a connection between
dicta in the majority opinion in Bush v. Gore20 and the famous “all deliberate speed”21 order after
Brown v. Board of Education,22 and suggests that despite the expense and logistical difficulty of 
standardizing voting machines within a state, the lesson of Brown is that when a judicial order is 
so important that it goes to the core of equal protection values, the Court should not give any
19 See 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
20
 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
21 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (holding that the District Courts should proceed 
with “with all deliberate speed” in its implementation of Brown I) [hereinafter Brown II]
22 See 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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leeway to the states to take their time in changing policy. PART VII summarizes the arguments 
made in this article and concludes by making recommendations to the Court.
PART I. THE PROBLEM: VARIATIONS IN VOTING TECHNOLOGY
In today’s elections, voters’ ability to impact an election varies depending on the type of 
voting machine used in their locality.23  According to Election Data Services, which has 
monitored election administration for the last twenty years, there were six broad categories of 
machines used by counties in the United States during the 2004 election: punch card,24 lever, 
paper ballots, optical scan, electronic, and mixed equipment.25  Political Scientists and legislators 
have documented significant differences in error rates for each type of machine, but voters do not 
choose which type of machine they will use to vote.26 The determining factor behind which type 
of machine is used within a locality is largely a combination of funding, politics, number of 
voters per polling place, and the standards set by state law.
There are a number of reasons why the intent of a voter entering a voting booth might not 
be reflected in what is eventually tallied by the election administrator and sent to state officials.  
Although some of these reasons might be attributed to election fraud by the onsite administrator 
23
 For a discussion of the various problems associated with different types of voting machines, see
Stewart v. Blackwell, Amicus Curiae Brief of Electronic Frontier Foundation, The Verified Voting 
Foundation, and Votersunite! and Citizens’ Alliance for Secure Elections, available at
http://www.eff.org/Activism/E-voting/20040805_Ohio_Amicus_Brief.pdf. 
24
 Kerry might have brought a legal action in Ohio based on the use of punch card balloting had the 
final vote count been slightly closer.  Prof. Dan Tokaji found that: “Overall, there were a total of 
94,488 residual votes in Ohio’s November 2004 presidential election. Of those, the substantial
majority (76,398) were cast using punch card equipment.”  The total residual votes, even if 
completely for Kerry, would not have turned Ohio “blue.” See Dan Tokaji, How Did Ohio’s Voting 
Equipment Fare in 2004?, Feb. 8, 2005, available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comment0208.html.
25
“New Study Shows 50 Million Voters Will Use Electronic Voting Systems, 32 Million Still with 
Punch Cards in 2004,” Election Data Services, Press Release, available at
http://www.electiondataservices.com/content/votingequipment.htm.
26 See Eric A. Fischer, CRS Report: RL30773: Voting Technologies in the United States: Overview 
and Issues for Congress, March 2001.
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or poll workers, this article does not seek to address these problems.27  State and federal law 
already deters, punishes, and seeks to rectify the fraud associated with these types of errors.28
Rather, this article discusses two general categories of voting frustration caused or enhanced by 
voting technology:  (1) errors when the voter votes, and (2) errors caused during the counting 
process.
First, the type of machine impacts one’s ability to overvote, undervote, or make an 
unintended choice,29 for example:
Lever machines can prevent overvoting through the use of interlocking 
mechanisms that prevent a voter from pulling a lever for more than one 
candidate for a given office. Electronic systems can prevent overvoting 
through an electronic equivalent of such a mechanism. Some marksense 
systems can reduce overvoting by permitting a ballot to be checked by the 
tabulator (sometimes called a “smart ballot box”) before submission and 
indicating if there is an overvote; the voter can then be given a new ballot.30
Although there are no machines that absolutely prevent an undervote, since voters are not 
required to vote for every office on the ballot, some machines indicate the races for which a voter 
has not selected a candidate, thus providing the voter with an opportunity to correct his 
“mistake.”  These machines, often electronic, force the voter to make a conscious decision to 
27
 For a discussion of voting fraud in recent elections, see Lori Minnite & David Callahan, “Securing 
the Vote: An Analysis of Election Fraud,” available at http://www.demos-usa.org/pubs/EDR_-
_Securing_the_Vote.pdf. 
28 See Disputes and questions linger 3 weeks after presidential vote; Election 2004, THE SEATTLE 
TIMES, A1, Nov. 25, 2004 (noting that “state officials regulate elections and the Justice Department 
prosecutes voting-rights violations and election fraud”).
29 See Fischer, supra note 26, at CRS-8 (“There are three basic kinds of error that a voter might 
make: overvote, undervote, and unintended choice. An overvote is a vote for more candidates for a 
particular office than is permitted, such as voting for two candidates for President, and is usually 
considered an error. An overvote on a ballot item invalidates the vote for that item. An undervote is a 
vote for fewer than permitted, such as voting for no candidate for President. An undervote may or 
may not be an error -- a voter might, on the one hand, have tried to vote for a candidate but was 
unsuccessful in marking the ballot unambiguously, or might, on the other hand, have chosen not to 
vote for any candidate.  An unintended choice is inadvertently voting for a candidate other than the 
one intended”).
30 See id.
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leave a section of the ballot blank.31  Unintended choice was a large problem in the 2000 election 
in Florida; most notably, the infamous “Butterfly Ballot.”32  Although machines generally cannot 
warn a voter about an unintended choice, since the machine cannot possibly know the voter’s 
intention, machines that allow for misalignment of ballots may cause more of these errors, and 
voting technology that allows a voter to review his selections prior to submission would help 
reduce them.  In all these ways, the type of voting technology that is used greatly impacts the 
accuracy of the manifestation of one’s intention.33
The second broad category of error caused by a machine is created by the counting 
mechanism associated with each machine.  This category is arguably more problematic since the 
voter has often left the polling place before her vote is tallied and the error is often attributable to 
31
 It is true, that even if the warn-and-correct technology is part of the machine’s package, it is still 
subject to human error.  In Florida during the 2000 election some election administrators did not 
understand the function or never turned it on.  See Walter Mebane, The Wrong Man is President! 
Overvotes in the 2000 Presidential Election in Florida, PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS, September 2004.
32 See id.; see also Steven J. Mulroy, Substantial Noncompliance and Reasonable Doubt: How the 
Florida Courts Got it Wrong in the Butterfly Ballot Case, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV 203 (2003); 
Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1201 (11th Cir. 2000) (“It was stated in the Palm Beach recount 
request that the particular configuration of the ballot in that county (the so-called ‘butterfly ballot’) 
had confused Palm Beach’s voters, producing two bad results: a substantial number of votes were 
disregarded because more than one choice was punched in the presidential race; and some voters may 
have inadvertently voted for someone other than their true choice”). 
33
 After the 2000 election debacle, I purchased a voting machine that had been used by a Florida 
polling site that utilized punch-card ballots, the ballots that caused the problems with “hanging 
chads.”  In fact, I found many chads littered around the machine’s packaging.  After having watched 
months of controversy and litigation regarding the standard that should be used to count these ballots, 
I was surprised to find clear instructions attached to the inside of the machine telling voters that they 
must fully punch through the card before submitting their ballot.  Although there could have been 
additional safeguards to ensure that voters fully punched their ballots, the voters were not without 
instruction or warning if they failed to vote properly without leaving “hanging chads.”
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a machine/technological failure, not human error.34
Consider an automated assembly line at an American factory.  If all of the machines 
operate perfectly, then a perfect product will emerge at the end of the line.  But, as is true of 
almost anything with an automatic function, there is an error rate.  Some miniscule percentage of 
products will emerge from the assembly line with imperfections.  In business, manufacturers 
factor in this error rate and understand that they will have to take a loss on some number of 
defective products.  In vote counting, failing to count these “defective” votes may significantly 
impact a close election.
Different tabulation error rates have been associated with each type of machine,35  for 
example: 
In the 2000 elections, 53.4 percent of California voters used punch-card 
machines, while the remainder used DRE or optical scan technologies.  The 
punch-card machines suffered error rates of 2.2 percent, more than twice 
that of the other technologies.  Thus, for every 10,000 votes cast in a punch-
card county, approximately 200 were discarded; in the other counties, fewer 
than 100 were lost to machine error.36
34
 These two categories are largely intended as guideposts as this paper discusses types of errors.  It is 
not clear which category some errors fall into.  For example, consider the “hanging chad” in Florida.  
This system was problematic at the time of voting since the technology failed to allow the voter to 
make a clear selection and did not warn the voter of potential errors, but it was also problematic 
during counting since the counting technology did not count many ballots that would have been votes 
if counted by a human.  See Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush v. Gore 
and the Political Currency of Local Government, 50 BUFFALO L. REV. 393, 393-94 (2002) (“The 
hanging chad became a running joke, a symbol of everything that was wrong with a process that had 
been badly bungled and was now running amok, and which was irretrievably corrupt. The skepticism 
that met the canvassing boards was ferocious. Indeed, to many around the country - whether in favor 
of or against recounting, whether Democrat or Republican - the pictures of individuals sitting at card 
tables in gymnasiums trying to decipher punch-card ballots were simply not consistent with their 
vision of American democracy at work”).  
35 See Residual Votes Attributable to Technology: An Assessment of the Reliability of Existing Voting 
Equipment (2001), The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, available at
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~voting/CalTech_MIT_Report_Version2.pdf; Fischer, supra note 26, at 
CRS-11.
36
 Marshall Camp, Note, Bush v. Gore: Mandate for Electoral Reform, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 409, 436 (2002).  
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Furthermore, a state’s decision to tabulate the votes at the precinct or county level further 
impacts the number of errors.37  Indeed, given the closeness of today’s elections, “the difference 
between the numbers of votes cast for the two leading candidates may be less than the error rates 
in the balloting and vote counting processes and machinery.”38  The wide variation in voting 
machines forces us to reassess what type of “equality” we want when it comes to the electoral 
process.
UNSTANDARDIZATION
Currently there are six main types of voting technologies being utilized throughout the 
United States.39  Each type of machine is associated with a certain error rate, and the error rates 
vary significantly.  Certainly in law, we accept a certain level of error in our proceedings and 
standards.  For example, in criminal cases, our standard of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
This is not absolute certainty, and we recognize that it is not a perfect system.40  Indeed, rarely in 
law do we find ourselves facing absolute certainty about any standard that is applied.41
However, we hope that our judicial standards are applied equally across race, socioeconomic 
factors, and jurisdiction.  
In the case of voting machines and the error rates the court accepts, there is not 
standardization.  Even across precinct within a locality, there may be very different machines and 
procedures when one arrives at the polls.  Analytically, the very fact that voting machines vary 
37 See Brian Kim, Recent Development: Help America Vote Act, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 579, 586 
(2003); Mebane, supra note 31, at 6.
38
 Joseph W. Little, Essay: Election Disputes and the Constitutional Right to Vote, 13 J. LAW. & PUB. 
POL’Y 37 (2001). 
39 See Table 1, infra.
40 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, High Court Warns About Test for Reasonable Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 22, 1994, at B8.
41 See Richard D. Friedman, EVIDENCE, 3rd ed., 39-42 (2004).
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significantly across the voting body for a given election seems particularly troubling to our 
notion of equality and “one person, one vote.”  After all, equal access and the ability to impact an 
election is the very basis of the Supreme Court’s continuous review of election laws and voting 
procedures through the lens of the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause.42
STANDING: DEFINING THE INJURY
Thus far, this article has demonstrated that certain voters have a greater likelihood that 
their vote will not count as a result of the voting machines they use when they arrive at the polls.  
Because this article lays out a constitutional challenge to the variation in voting machines, and a 
challenge cannot go forward without establishing standing,43 it is important to more specifically 
define the injury.44  As the Supreme Court has noted:
The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact,” an invasion of a 
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 
actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” Second, there must 
be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, 
the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party 
not before the court. Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely 
“speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”45
No voter can know for sure whether or not their vote was counted; anonymity remains an 
42 See Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 693-94 (1989) (noting “[e]lectoral systems should 
strive to make each citizen’s portion equal”).
43
 For discussion of standing in voting rights litigation, see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, 
Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276 (1998); Judith Reed, 
Sense and Nonsense: Standing in the Racial Districting Cases as a Window on the Supreme Court’s View 
of the Right to Vote, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 389 (1999); Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein, 
Identifying the Harm in Racial Gerrymandering Claims, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 47 (1996).
44 See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding The Right To An Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663 
(2001) (discussing the tension in the caselaw between “the highly individualistic view of rights 
developed by the  Rehnquist Court and the group-based conception of harm evident in many other 
areas of the law”).
45 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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essential part of the electoral process.  Thus, after an election,46 no voter could argue that their 
individual vote had not been counted as a result of the machine malfunction. But if the standard 
was proving individual harm to a certainty, almost no vote dilution case could go forward: A 
voter in a precinct where the pollworkers threw away all but one ballot when the polls closed 
would have no redress in the courts under this narrow conception of standing.  For this reason, 
defendants in voting cases that challenge standing on the basis that a voter has failed to allege an 
injury to his own individual rights have not succeeded on this ground:
Because the voting process is anonymous, it is impossible for any one voter 
to know with more certainty that their intended votes were not counted. If 
standing in cases like this one required more, then no one would have 
standing to challenge a system with, for example, a 20% or 30% or 60% 
residual vote rate, or a policy under which every tenth ballot was 
systematically discarded instead of counted. Such results would be contrary 
to both voting rights and standing law. Further, the injury here alleged, is 
not the State’s failure to count any one person’s vote, but the higher 
probability of that vote not being counted as a result of the voting systems 
used, i.e., vote dilution. That injury is both provable and traceable . . . Vote 
dilution as “directly related to voting, the most basic of political rights, is 
sufficiently concrete and specific.”47
Indeed, the probabilistic injury, which has been demonstrated throughout this PART of the article, 
is enough to establish standing, as is consistent with court decisions in other areas of the law.48
46
 Some defendants in cases challenging voting mechanisms have even suggested that the case should 
be dismissed on account of “mootness” because the case was either brought before an injury could be 
shown or after the injury had occurred and the election could not be undone.  These arguments have 
been rejected.  See, e.g., Stewart v. Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (refusing to 
dismiss the case “on the issue of mootness”); Toney v. White, 488 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding 
that the claim was properly considered even though the litigation was filed one month after election 
in question had occurred).
47 Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 895 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
48 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 61 n.10 (1976) (“Clearly there is no difference 
for purposes of Art. III standing - personal interest sufficient for concrete adverseness - between a 
small but certain injury and a harm of a larger magnitude discounted by some probability of its 
nonoccurrence. If the probability of the more ultimate harm is so small as to make the claim clearly 
frivolous, the plaintiff can be hastened from the court by summary judgment”); McGuffage, 209 F. 
Supp. 2d at 895 (citing Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980) and finding that voters had standing to 
bring a challenge to the use of different voting mechanisms based on a probabilistic injury).
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This article repeatedly revisits and refines this description of the injury, but many courts have 
found the injury, as described thus far, sufficient for the purpose of establishing standing under 
Article III.49  Certainly, standardization of voting machines would remediate this injury.  Of 
course, even with standardization, there would still be a chance a vote would not be counted, 
since no machine has a 0% error rate.  However, the injury asserted here, in the equal protection 
sense, is really the relative probabilistic chance that one’s vote will not count in comparison with 
other voters in the same state.  This is a definable injury with a remedial solution, and because 
there is a definable injury and a remedial fix, the question that remains is whether the courts can 
mandate this fix using the Fourteenth Amendment or Voting Rights Act.
PART II. “ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE”
Throughout the last fifty years, the courts have routinely stepped in when fundamental 
voting rights have been impeded. Election law is largely left up to the states, but according to 
the Supreme Court:
[w]hen a State exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it 
is insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried 
over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a 
federally protected right.  The conception of political equality from the 
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the 
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one
thing -- one person, one vote.50
The “one person, one vote” standard is repeated today throughout legal scholarship and has 
49 See, e.g., McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 895 (“Plaintiffs have standing to raise the claims 
asserted”); Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (acknowledging the strength of the defendant’s argument, 
but declining “the invitation to dismiss the case on standing”).
50 Gray, 372 U.S. at 381.
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become a mainstream maxim when it comes to election policy.51  However, the words “one 
person, one vote” do not appear in Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution,52 the section the 
Supreme Court has relied upon in formulating its “one person, one vote” standard, and its 
strictness in application and scope are not always clear.  The application of the “one person, one 
vote” standard has evolved through the case law, and a better understanding of its development, 
will facilitate this article’s discussion of how a legal challenge to variations in voting machines 
could fit into the “one person, one vote” jurisprudence.
ENTERING THE “POLITICAL THICKET”
Historically, the federal courts stayed away from issues they perceived as political in 
nature and were reluctant to review issues related to elections for fear of impeding on local 
autonomy.53  However, the laissez faire period in the Court’s elections law jurisprudence has 
long passed.54  Today, the courts decide many issues related to the election and rarely shy away 
from reviewing the electoral process.55  Using equal protection analysis, the Court has said that 
States cannot treat voters differently in three respects: (1) Right to cast a vote; (2) Right to an 
equally-weighted vote; (3) Right to have vote counted.56  However, the Court is constantly 
51
 When American and Iraqi leaders recently developed election policy for Iraqi elections, many 
analysts and even Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani argued that in order for the election to be fair, it must 
operate on a one person, one vote system.  See Robin Wright, President Hails Election As a Success 
and a Signal, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 31, 2005, at A1.  This demonstrates how universally 
recognized the American “one person, one vote” principle has become.
52
 U.S. Const. art. I, 2.
53 See Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (providing a number of justifications for the judiciary 
staying out of political apportionment questions).
54 See, e.g., Bush, 531 U.S. 98.
55 See Bush, 531 U.S. 98 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“When contending parties invoke the process of the 
courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional 
issues the judicial system has been forced to confront”).
56
 Camp, supra note 36, at 418.
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refining and expanding the amorphous “right to vote,”57 and “history has seen a continuing 
expansion of the scope of the right of suffrage in this country.”58  Recognizing that “[t]he right to 
vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any 
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government,” the Court seeks to 
attain greater equality in all aspects of the electoral process.59
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF “ABSOLUTE EQUALITY” IS NOT AN IMPEDIMENT
However, while striving to achieve greater equality in the electoral process, the courts 
have been reluctant to require “absolute equality” when conducting their equal protection 
analysis.60  In the reapportionment line of equal protection cases, the Supreme Court recognized 
that despite even the most genuine efforts to create equality between electoral districts, other 
factors would create some level of inequality.  For example, the Karcher Court found that “[a]ny 
standard, including absolute equality, involves a certain artificiality. . . [E]ven the census data are 
not perfect, and the well-known restlessness of the American people means that population 
counts for particular localities are outdated long before they are completed.”61  Applying this 
reasoning to voting machines, one might conclude that the Court would be willing to allow a 
certain level of inequality when it comes to error rates, and that we should just accept that there 
are a number of factors that are uncontrollable, and machine error rate is just one of such factor.  
However, as the Court recognized in Karcher, the distinction between apportionment inequality 
57 See id.
58 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
59 Id.
60 See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 778 (1983) (J. White dissenting) (“by extending Kirkpatrick
to deviations below even the 1% level, the redistricting plan in every State with more than a single 
Representative is rendered vulnerable to after-the-fact attack by anyone with a complaint and a 
calculator”).
61 Id. at 732.
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made by the legislature and imperfections in census data is that the latter “apply equally to any 
population-based standard we could choose.”62
As one court recently noted:
Neither the federal courts, nor likely anyone, can guarantee to every eligible 
voter in this country a perfect election with 100% accuracy. The courts can, 
however, by enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, guarantee the equal treatment of voters 
who attempt to have their votes counted, their voices heard.63
The error rates made during machine vote counting line up with the apportionment 
inequality in Karcher which the Court found unacceptable, because the errors are tolerated by 
the state, and do not strike evenly across jurisdiction.  The Court recognizes that in all elections 
there are certain uncontrollable factors that lead to “inequality,”  it is the controllable ones that do 
not “apply equally” across a population that must be weeded out through legislative changes and 
judicial review.  Disparate voting technology is one such controllable problem.
HAVING ONE’S VOTE COUNT AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
“The United States Supreme Court has clearly stated that the right to vote is a 
fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”64 If voting is a fundamental right, 
then it would seem that having one’s vote count equally is a natural extension of this right, and 
thus triggers strict scrutiny.  Although grounded in the 15th Amendment,65 not the 14th
Amendment, the Court in Gray v. Sanders specifically linked the right to cast a vote with the 
right to have one’s vote counted:
62 Id.
63 McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
64 Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2001) [hereinafter Common 
Cause I]; see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (discussing the “close constitutional 
scrutiny” for voting restrictions).
65 See Gray, 372 U.S. at 376 (“this case . . . does not involve a question of the degree to which the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the authority of a State Legislature”).
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The Court has consistently recognized that all qualified voters have a 
constitutionally protected right to cast their ballots and have them counted 
at Congressional elections. Every voter’s vote is entitled to be counted once. 
It must be correctly counted and reported. The right to have one’s vote 
counted has the same dignity as the right to put a ballot in a box. It can be 
protected from the diluting effect of illegal ballots. And these rights must be 
recognized in any preliminary election that in fact determines the true 
weight a vote will have.66
This linkage between the casting and counting of a vote is consistent with a long line of court 
decisions.67
Bush v. Gore seriously enhanced the equal protection arguments with regard to vote 
counting:
First, Bush establishes that state action regarding vote-counting is fully 
subject to the equality principles it perceives inherent in the right to vote. 
Second, Bush expands upon existing doctrine in defining those principles. 
The opinion finds an equal protection violation in unequal treatment despite 
the absence of any discrete and articulable voter “classification” (arguably 
the pith of the Court’s voting rights doctrine prior to Bush), ignores whether 
uneven treatment is intentional in assessing whether the Equal Protection  
Clause is violated, and employs an elevated standard of review in assessing 
purported justifications for any uneven treatment. The extension of 
evolutionary equality norms to the context of vote-counting, combined with 
a heightened standard of inquiry into purported justifications, represents the 
essential equal protection “rule” of Bush.68
The fundamental right that must be protected according to Bush v. Gore is the right to an equal 
valuation of one’s vote at all stages of the voting process: “[h]aving once granted the right to 
vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one 
person’s vote over that of another.”69
66 Id. at 380.
67 See United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915) (“the right to have one’s vote counted is as 
open to protection by Congress as the right to put a ballot in a box”); United States v. Classic, 313 
U.S. 299 (1941).
68
 Camp, supra note 36, at 417.
69 Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-105.  Note that the use of the term “arbitrariness” seems to suggest that a 
lower standard of review should be applied.  See Mulroy, supra note 32, at 374.
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One of the challenges made in Bush v. Gore  was whether disparate manual counting 
methods without uniformity violated the Equal Protection Clause.70  Similarly, a challenge to the 
variation of voting machines would hinge on whether machines with different counting methods 
without uniformity violate the Equal Protection Clause.  Thus if one equates humans counting 
votes in Florida after the 2000 election with voting machines, the legal challenges look basically 
identical.  Although one might question whether the Bush rule “actually applies to the mechanics 
of vote-counting or whether it is limited to systemic concerns such as methods of election and 
districting . . . Bush v. Gore seems to invite this analogy.”71  Thus, it would appear from the 
language in Bush that the use of different voting machines may violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Whether states can fashion a sufficiently compelling justification for continuing to use
such diverse technologies when they have defined different consequences for recording votes is 
one of the “important questions of Equal Protection and the right to vote that Bush v. Gore now 
opens up.”72
BUSH v. GORE APPLIES TO MACHINES
Some scholars have suggested, quite persuasively, that Bush v. Gore applies only to the 
“expressive harm” caused by the public and poorly managed recount in Florida.73 Arguably, the 
expressive harm caused by perceptions of illegitimacy due to the widespread publication of 
stories about faulty machines and the reality that when minorities go to the polls to vote they are 
more likely to see these faulty machines is just as large as the “expressive harm” discussed in 
Bush.  At the time of the holding, it is possible that the Court was less focused on the voting 
70 See 531 U.S. 98.
71
 Mulroy, supra note 32, at 371-72.
72 Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan, & Richard Pildes, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 306-07 (2nd ed., 2002).
73 See Gerken, supra note 44, at 411.
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machinery than it was on the laughable manual recount process.  However, most scholars and 
courts have argued that Bush v. Gore applies to vote counting processes more generally, and that 
even if it was not intended, the language of Bush is applicable generally to voting standards and 
technologies, not just the specific expressive harm caused by the Florida recounts:
[The Supreme Court] has asserted a new constitutional requirement: to 
avoid disparate and unfair treatment of voters. And this obligation 
obviously cannot be limited to the recount process alone. The court 
condemns the fact that ‘standards for accepting or rejecting contested 
ballots might vary not only from county to county but indeed within a single 
county.’ That criticism surely would apply to the variations in voting 
machines across Florida, and, for that matter, to similar variations in all 
other states. The court’s new standard may create a more robust 
constitutional examination of voting practices.74
Bush was about vote counting procedures and inequality.  The varied use of the Bush decision in 
the last four years demonstrates that there is no general consensus on the applicability of Bush to 
voting machines, but beyond its general limiting language, almost nothing in the opinion 
suggests that it cannot be extended to vote counting mechanisms generally:75
Only Justice Souter writing in dissent advances justifications for the 
distinction between recounting and balloting that seem, if not persuasive, at 
least arguable. Souter suggests that local variety in balloting technology is 
justified by “concerns about cost, the potential value of innovation, and so 
on,” a claim that echoes the much less explicit reference by the majority to 
“local expertise.”76
Certainly, without any explicit and convincing argument that that the language in Bush cannot be 
applied to voting machines, the courts should, and have, broadly interpreted its application:
What is missing from the opinion is an explanation of why the situation in 
the case is distinctive, and hence to be treated differently from countless 
apparently similar situations involving equal protection problems. The 
74 Samuel Issacharoff, “The Court’s Legacy for Voting Rights,” N.Y. TIMES, at A39 (Dec. 14, 2000).
75 See Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan, & Richard Pildes, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 309 (2nd ed., 2002); see also “Subsequent Use of Bush v. 
Gore in the Courts,” infra.
76
 Camp, supra note 36, at 441.
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effort to cabin the outcome, without a sense of the principle to justify the 
cabining, gives the opinion an unprincipled cast.77
This conclusion will be unpacked further below in PART V.
BUSH’S LIMITING LANGUAGE
In Bush v. Gore, the Court limited the precedential value of the decision by noting that 
“[the Court’s] consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal 
protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”78  The Court reasoned 
that its decision should be limited because of the “many complexities” of equal protection 
analysis,79 but even if one does not believe that Bush’s precedential value is limited, perhaps the 
Court would be willing to cite its decision in Bush v. Gore in the context of voting machines 
since the challenges to different counting procedures and different counting machines are so 
similar.80  At least one court has already reasoned that the answer is that Bush v. Gore can, and 
should, be cited in this context.81
Bush stands as more than just a fact-specific result, more than a 
meaningless judicial coin-toss. Seven of nine Supreme Court Justices 
77
 Cass R. Sunstein, Symposium, Bush v. Gore: Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 765 
(2001).
78 Bush, 531 U.S. at 109; see William C. Smith, Bush vs. Gore: Evermore: Plaintiffs Use High Court 
Voting Case in Other Lawsuits, ABA Law Journal, 87 A.B.A.J. 16 (May 2001), available at
http://www.pawalaw.com/assets/aba_journal_article.pdf.
79 Bush, 531 U.S. at 109; see Smith, supra note 78 (“the High Court seemed to be expecting a one-hit 
wonder”).
80 See Elizabeth Garrett, Symposium, The Law of Democracy: New Issues In The Law of Democracy: 
Democracy In The Wake of The California Recall, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 239, 267 (arguing that “Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s prediction that Bush v. Gore was a “one of a kind case” was premature (or 
perhaps wishful thinking)”).
81 McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 898 (“Although the [Bush v. Gore] Court limited its decision to the 
then present circumstances, the rationale behind the decision provides much guidance to the situation 
in this case, which presents, as far as this Court can tell, a matter of first impression in this Circuit 
and, indeed, this country. That question is whether a state may allow the use of different types of 
voting equipment with substantially different levels of accuracy, or if such a system violates equal 
protection”); see also Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882, 895 (9th 
Cir.) (relying on Bush v. Gore), vacated by 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003).
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concurred on the equal protection holding, and if the Court insists on saying 
something is so, then it is so.  What the majority said, precisely, was 
explained in a nearly 4,000 word, twelve-page per curiam opinion - an 
opinion by which it and all other courts ostensibly are now bound in 
interpreting the Constitution.  Such a pronouncement by the United States 
Supreme Court can not flippantly be ignored.  Moreover, widespread public 
approval of the Bush decision may do more to assure its long-term 
legitimacy than will the firmness of its doctrinal footing.82
LEVEL OF SCRUTINY: A SEVERE INFRINGEMENT ON THE RIGHT TO VOTE
As is true in any Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the court must determine what level 
of scrutiny should be applied during review.  For example, classifications based on race are 
subject to strict scrutiny,83 classifications based on sex are subject to intermediate scrutiny,84 and 
those classifications which affect fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny.85  Although I 
will consider the impact that race may have on a potential challenge later in this article, in the 
wake of Washington v. Davis, disparate impact alone on racial minorities is not enough to trigger 
strict scrutiny without intent under the Fourteenth amendment.86  Thus, any argument that strict 
scrutiny should apply would probably have to be grounded in a fundamental rights line of 
reasoning.
The Court has been somewhat ambiguous as to the level of scrutiny that should apply 
when examining potential violations of the fundamental right to vote.  Certainly, Bush has 
82
 Camp, supra note 36, at 411 [internal citations omitted].
83 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
84 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
85 See, e.g., Griswold vs. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
86 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (finding that “[d]isproportionate impact is not 
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the 
Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule, that racial classifications are to be subjected 
to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations); see also Johnson 
v. Governor of Florida, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5945 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Of course, the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits a state from using a facially neutral law to intentionally discriminate on 
the basis of race”); but see Camp, supra note 36, at 425 (“By ignoring the emergence of intent-based 
review, Bush wipes away another potential objection by clearly implying that intent is not a 
requirement for an equal protection violation in the vote-counting context”).
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confused many constitutional scholars and lower courts that have looked to see what level of 
scrutiny was applied by the Court.  This is discussed further in PART V.87
Although Bush appears to address the fun damentality of the right to have one’s vote 
counted,88 if the Court truly treated its opinion in Bush as unprecedential, then under the pre -
Bush jurisprudence courts could still apply strict scrutiny.  In Burdick, a 1992 case, the Court 
outlined the balancing of interests that it considered in determining whether to apply strict 
scrutiny in the election law context:
Under this standard of weighing the character and magnitude of the asserted 
injury against the constitutional rights sought to be vindicated, the 
rigorousness of the court’s inquiry into the propriety of a state election law 
depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens U.S. 
Const. amend. I and XIV rights. Thus, when those rights are subjected to 
“severe” restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a 
state interest of compelling importance. But when a state election law 
provision imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon 
the U.S. Const. amend. I and XIV rights of voters, the state’s important 
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.89
This methodology suggests that if the restriction is not “severe” enough, heightened review, or 
the requirement of a “compelling importance,” do not apply.90  In the pre-Bush ju risprudence a 
challenge to disparities in voting machines would probably include a discussion of the severity of 
the harm caused by the variation.91  However, any notion that the burden on the right to vote is 
not severe enough to warrant strict scrutiny is strongly rebutted by evidence demonstrating the 
large disparities that error rates and variation of technology have on individuals and communities 
87 See “PART V.  Subsequent Use of Bush v. Gore in the Courts,” infra.
88 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 105, 108 (referring to voting as a “fundamental right”).
89 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
90 See id.
91 See id.
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with less accurate technology.92
FATAL IN THIS CASE: APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY
Although strict scrutiny does not invalidate all laws,93 absent a showing of a compelling
state interest that is narrowly tailored, a law will be deemed unconstitutional.94  Unlike earlier 
voting rights cases where the Court was forced to consider strong arguments from the State with 
regard to the compelling purpose of a law being challenged, most of the arguments for 
maintaining dissimilar voting technology are grounded in the practicality of replacing the voting 
machines.  States have made a number of procedural and constitutional arguments against the 
application of heightened review, based on a lack of standing, and even based on the absence of 
“invidious intent,” but if the court was at the point of applying strict scrutiny, the laws allowing 
disparate technologies would almost definitely be struck down.95  In the face of a fixable 
infringement, the Court should apply heightened review and force compliance.96
THE COUNTER-ARGUMENTS: COST AND LOCAL AUTONOMY
Even though a fundamental right is implicated, the costs of instituting standardization 
would be unprecedented in elections administration and cannot be ignored in any considerations 
of standardization.97  With the current budgetary problems facing state governments and the 
92 See id. (“when those rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly 
drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance”) [emphasis added].
93 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (reminding the parties that “strict scrutiny is 
not strict in theory, but fatal in fact”).
94 Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005).
95 See McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 900 (considering the main arguments that States make in 
support of upholding their statutes).
96 See Dillard v. Baldwin County Board of Education, 686 F.Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (finding 
that in the face of a racial dilution constitutional violation “the selection of a plan with seven, rather 
than five, single-member districts reflects a conservative remedy limited to only those measures 
necessary to cure the violation”).
97 Sunstein, supra note 77, at 765.
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growing federal deficit, many political leaders would probably argue that American tax dollars 
could be spent better elsewhere.98  Although this argument might suggest that the courts need to 
order standardization, since Congress and the legislatures will not, it is also a somewhat 
convincing justification for a gradual move to better, and more standardized, voting technology; 
rather than a complete overhaul prior to the next election cycle.99  This may ultimately rest on a 
public policy consideration by the Court, but given that the election is the focal point of 
American democracy, “replacing voting systems that deprive individuals of the right to vote is 
clearly in the public interest.”100
As was described above, election administration has traditionally been left to local 
autonomy.101  Thus, if Congress or the courts entered the “thicket” of voting mechanisms, one 
might argue that they had overstepped the powers of the federal government.102  However, this 
argument seems extremely unlikely.  If there is one lesson from Bush v. Gore, it is that the 
federal courts will not hesitate to get involved in elections and any exit from the “political 
thicket” would be difficult for the courts at this point.103  Certainly, there is no reason to believe 
the courts would restrain from involvement in a challenge to voting machines, when they have 
become so deeply involved in the enforcement of equality in elections.104
98 Id.
99 See “Part VI. Bush, Brown  and Lessons Learned from “All Deliberate Speed,” infra.
100 Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that the only 
question was the feasibility of replacing the machines before the next election) [hereinafter Common 
Cause II]. 
101
 Sunstein, supra note 77, at 766 (considering the implications of Bush v. Gore on “longstanding 
rules of local autonomy”).
102 See id.
103 See Pamela S. Karlan, Symposium, Federal Courts and Electoral Politics: Exit Strategies in 
Constitutional Law: Lessons for Getting The Least Dangerous Branch Out of The Political Thicket 
82 B.U.L. REV. 667 (2002).
104 See “Entering the ‘Political Thicket,’” infra.
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In summation, using the “one person, one vote” standard and applying strict scrutiny, the 
courts should strike down any state law that does not require equal error rates in the voting 
machines it uses.  The disparity in voting machines is altering the likelihood that a vote will be 
counted, thus violating that voter’s fundamental right to vote without a compelling justification 
for doing so.105  This is consistent with other cases implicating a fundamental right,106 and with 
previous cases where voting was found to be a fundamental right.107
At least one court has already suggested, even if strict scrutiny is not the standard, under 
any standard of review, the use of disparate voting machines would be unconstitutional:
Even if the more lenient standard is ultimately applied by this Court, 
Plaintiff has alleged facts indicating that the Secretary of State’s permission 
to counties to adopt either punch-card voting procedures or more reliable 
voting procedures is unreasonable and discriminatory.108
After all, in the face of a blatant inequality, the two most proffered reasons for maintaining the 
disparity in machines, cost and local autonomy, seem insufficient.
105 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 105, 108 (referring to voting as a “fundamental right”).
106 See, e.g., Griswold vs. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
107 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (“Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free 
and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired 
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right 
of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized”); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (“the political franchise of voting as a fundamental political 
right, because preservative of all rights”); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); see also
Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1232 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that “when a state election law 
burdens a fundamental constitutional right severely, that law may survive only if it satisfies strict 
scrutiny”). But see Common Cause I, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (“The Supreme Court, however, has not 
clearly articulated the level of scrutiny which courts are to give to alleged infringements of the 
fundamental right to vote”); Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432 (“Petitioner proceeds from the erroneous 
assumption that a law that imposes any burden upon the right to vote must be subject to strict 
scrutiny. Our cases do not so hold”).
108 Common Cause I, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1109.
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PART III.  THE PROBLEM REVISITED: WHERE THE WORST MACHINES ARE FOUND AND AN 
ARGUMENT FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
Although it remains unclear whether the Court would accept a “mathematical equality”109
“one person, one vote” or fundamental rights argument as justification for requiring the 
standardization of voting technology, the addition of a race-based argument would significantly 
increase the pressure on the Court under the 14th Amendment:110 After all, when a system has a 
“greater negative impact on groups defined by traditionally suspect criteria, there is cause for 
serious concern.”111  There is significant evidence that the lack of standardized voting technology 
has a disparate impact on urban and minority communities.112  This PART of the article
demonstrates this impact and examines the effect it should have on a legal challenge.113
109 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 258 (1962). But see Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566 (“We are 
cautioned about the dangers of entering into political thickets and mathematical quagmires. Our 
answer is this: a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and 
our office require no less of us).
110 See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971) (searching for evidence that Blacks “had less 
opportunity than did other Marion County residents to participate in the political processes and to 
elect legislators of their choice”); see also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 349 (1960) 
(Whitaker, J., concurring) (finding “that the decision should be rested not on the Fifteenth 
Amendment, but rather on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution”). 
111 McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 899.
112
 Michael Tomz & Robert P. Van Houweling, How Does Voting Equipment Affect the Racial Gap 
in Voided Ballots?, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Vol. 47, No. 1. (Jan. 2003), at 46-60; 
Special Investigations Division, Committee on Government Reform, Income and Racial Disparities 
in the Undercount in the 2000 Presidential Election, Report for the U.S. House of Representatives, 
Jul. 2001; see A Racial Gap in Voided Votes, Precinct Analysis Finds Stark Inequity in Polling 
Problems, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 27, 2000.
113
 It is interesting that efforts to introduce internet voting have met substantial resistance from civil 
rights activists who question the impact that internet voting will have on different communities, 
given the differences in access to the internet based on the economic, and thus racial, makeup of 
particular constituencies.  However, these same concerns do not appear in the mainstream press 
regarding the differences in access to traditional voting technologies.  See Kristen E. Larson, Fulfill 
Your Civic Duty Over The Internet, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1797, 1814 (2001) (finding that some 
of the litigation in this area “arose from the idea that poor and minority voters do not have equal 
access to Internet voting systems, because they do not have computers or Internet access at home or 
work”).
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As new voting technology reaches the market, wealthy jurisdictions pride themselves on
providing it to their voters;114 but the poorer neighborhoods end up with the old, and less 
accurate, voting machines that the wealthier neighborhoods pass down.  As one journalist aptly 
noted, “votes don’t spoil because they’re left out of the fridge. It comes down to the machines. 
Just as poor people get the crap schools and crap hospitals, they get the crap voting machines.”115
Because the worst machines and technologies are employed in poorer jurisdictions and inner 
cities where voting technology upgrades are not a high budgetary priority, the lack of an upgrade 
hinders, in a statistically significant way, the effectiveness of the urban, and thus minority, 
vote.116 Classes of voters who should be “similarly situated” are not being treated similarly.117
CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS
After the 2000 election, Rep. Roybal-Allard requested the first report at the national level 
to investigate race and income’s connection to the number of undercounted and uncounted votes
in the 2000 election.118  The investigation examined forty congressional districts in twenty states; 
twenty of the districts had high poverty rates and a large minority population, twenty had low 
114 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2435-36 (suggesting that 
the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment “did believe that caste or class legislation was forbidden; 
but they did not fully unpack the category” and that they thought it was a “small subset of legislation, 
involving illegitimate grounds for differential treatment”).
115 See Greg Palast, An Election Spoiled Rotten, BALTIMORE CHRONICLE & SENTINEL, Nov. 1, 2004, 
available at http://baltimorechronicle.com/110204Palast.shtml.
116
 Special Investigations Division, Committee on Government Reform, Income and Racial 
Disparities in the Undercount in the 2000 Presidential Election, Report for the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Jul. 2001; see A Racial Gap in Voided Votes; Precinct Analysis Finds Stark Inequity 
in Polling Problems, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 27, 2000.
117 See generally, Sunstein, supra note 114 (discussing the development of the equal protection 
doctrine to mean that “similarly situated” Americans must be treated “similarly” under the 
Fourteenth Amendment).
118 Income and Racial Disparities in the Undercount in the 2000 Presidential Election, Minority 
Staff, Spec. Investigations Division, Comm. on Gov’t Reform, U.S. H.R., prepared for Rep. Roybal-
Allard, Jul. 9, 2001, at 2 [hereinafter Roybal-Allard Report]. 
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poverty rates and a small minority population.119  The report made three significant findings: (1) 
Voters in low-income, high-minority districts were significantly more likely to have their votes 
discarded than voters in affluent, low-minority districts; (2) Better voting technology 
significantly reduced uncounted votes in low-income, high minority districts; and (3) Better 
voting technology significantly narrowed the disparity in uncounted votes between low-income, 
high-minority districts and affluent, low-minority districts.120  Essentially, voters in low-income, 
high-minority districts had worse machines and these machines caused more minority votes to be 
discarded.121
The findings of the report are consistent with other studies of elections.122  In a recent 
study of the racial gap in voting errors, Tomz and Van Houweling found that “the black-white 
gap in voided ballots depends crucially on the voting equipment that people use.”123  They found 
that the use of DRE and lever machines cut the gap in the voting errors by a factor of ten.124
Although they found that the machines were not the only factor in differences in error rates, 
citing African-Americans’ propensity to intentionally undervote at a higher rate than Whites, 
119
 In order to create the sample of congressional districts, “information was obtained from the 
Congressional Research Service” and the districts were selected based on the 1990 census data.  
Districts were not selected if their boundaries had changed prior to the 2000 election.  See Roybal-
Allard Report.
120
 Roybal-Allard Report at i.
121 See Roybal-Allard Report.
122 See Mebane, supra note 31, at 3 (finding “[i]t is well established that throughout Florida blacks 
and Democrats tended to be disproportionately aected by voting problems”);  see Stephen Knack & 
Martha Kropf, Invalidated Ballots in the 1996 Presidential Election: A County-Level Analysis, 
Working Paper, University of Maryland & University of Missouri, Kansas City (May 2001), 
available at http://unofficial.umkc.edu/kropfm/invalidv.pdf, at 31 (finding “counties with more 
African Americans and Hispanics have higher rates of invalidated ballots” and discussing similar 
election studies); see also McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 899 (finding the variation is “impacting 
African American and Hispanic groups disproportionately”).
123
 Michael Tomz & Robert P. Van Houweling, How Does Voting Equipment Affect the Racial Gap 
in Voided Ballots?, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Vol. 47, No. 1. (Jan. 2003), at 58.
124 Id.
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they found that when machines were standardized, the gap was between 0.3 and 0.7 percentage 
points,125 suggesting that standardization would basically eliminate any racial differences.  Thus, 
standardization would be one the easiest fixes to a serious state-supported racial disparity in 
American history.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT + RACE = HEIGHTENED STRICT SCRUTINY?
The studies are enlightening and arguably unsurprising, but the current widespread 
consensus in political science that voting machines dilute the minority vote suggests a breach of 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  The racial impact of a system that uses a variety of 
machines is now certainly foreseeable.126 Indeed, although it is unlikely that intent on the part of 
the legislatures could be shown,127 the combination of a fundamental right and race suggests that 
an extremely high level of scrutiny should be applied.
Although the Court has historically separated its analysis of classifications and 
fundamental rights as two separate strands of equal protection,128 when a fundamental right is 
implicated, a classification in effect, not necessarily intent could be enough to further heighten
125 Id.
126 Cf. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 511 n.17 (1979) (“To add the word 
‘foreseeable’ does not change the analysis, because the police department in Davis would be hard 
pressed to say that the disparate impact of the examination was unforeseeable”). 
127 Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (finding that “[d]isproportionate impact is not 
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the 
Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule, that racial classifications are to be subjected 
to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations).
128 See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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the level of review.129  The use of the levels of scrutiny is formulaic, but in application, the levels
are extremely abstract and open to interpretation as to how they should be applied. When 
considering race and voting laws the Court should be immediately suspect of any laws that have 
a large disparate impact on a “discrete and insular” group’s ability to access the political 
process.130
PART IV. A POTENTIAL CHALLENGE UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Although this analysis of the constitutionality of the variation of voting machines focuses 
on the implications of Bush v. Gore, and Bush does not focus on the Voting Rights Act, 131 any 
analysis of the intersection of elections and race would be incomplete without a discussion of the 
Voting Rights Act’s impact on a constitutional challenge.132 After all, the Voting Rights Act was 
enacted to “ensure that minority voters no longer will have to raise their voices against judicial 
tyranny,”133 and was the most important legislation passed by Congress during the Civil Rights 
129 See id. at 114 (Marshall, J. dissent) (arguing that “[u]nder the Equal Protection Clause, if a 
classification impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the 
Constitution, . . . strict judicial scrutiny is required, regardless of whether the infringement was 
intentional.  As I will explain, our cases recognize a fundamental right to equal electoral participation 
that encompasses protection against vote dilution. Proof of discriminatory purpose is, therefore, not 
required to support a claim of vote dilution. The plurality’s erroneous conclusion to the contrary is 
the result of a failure to recognize the central distinction between White v. Regester and Washington 
v. Davis: the former involved an infringement of a constitutionally protected right, while the latter 
dealt with a claim of racially discriminatory distribution of an interest to which no citizen has a 
constitutional entitlement”).
130 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
131 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 103 (establishing up front that “[t]he petition presents the following 
questions: whether the Florida Supreme Court established new standards for resolving Presidential 
election contests, thereby violating Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution and failing to 
comply with 3 U.S.C. § 5, and whether the use of standardless manual recounts violates the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses”).
132 See Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan, & Richard Pildes, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 306-07 (2nd ed., 2002) (asking “[i]s there also a role for 
courts in policing voting technologies, both before and after Bush v. Gore?”).
133
 James Thomas Tucker, Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of Consent Under Section 2 of
The Voting Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 443, 611 (1999).
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Era.  President Lyndon Baines Johnson called the Act “one of the most monumental laws in the 
entire history of American freedom.”134 Despite lofty descriptions of the Voting Rights Act, the 
Act’s applicability to the unintentional disparate impact on protected minorities created by a 
statewide variation of voting machines is not unequivocal, and may reach beyond the scope of 
Congress’ enforcement powers.135  In this PART, I argue that the Voting Rights Act should be 
“interpreted in a manner that provides the broadest possible scope” and should be used by the 
courts to standardize voting machines.136
SCOPE OF CONGRESS’ ENFORCEMENT POWERS 
UNDER THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS
The scope of Congress’ enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
amendments has been heavily litigated over the last decade with respect to the Voting Rights 
Act.137 “[T]he Supreme Court has instructed . . . that statutes should not be construed to alter the 
constitutional balance between the states and the federal government unless Congress makes its 
intent to do so unmistakably clear.”138  Indeed, because there is no explicit standard for 
determining whether an application of the Voting Rights Act would extend beyond the scope of 
134
 Ken Gormley, Essay, Racial Mind-Games and Reapportionment: When can Race be Considered 
(Legitimately) in Redistricting?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 735, 793 (2002).
135
 Essentially, the applicability of the Voting Rights Act to this type of challenge could be framed by 
asking the question: If Congress passed a bill to standardize voting technology at the state level, or 
even at the federal level, would this action be beyond the scope of Congress’ powers?  (Thanks to 
Professor Katz for pointing out this structuring of the constitutional question.) 
136 See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991).
137 See Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that a number of recent 
Supreme Court decisions have looked at the scope of the enforcement powers under the 
Reconstruction Amendments); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966) 
(“States have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be 
exercised. The gist of the matter is that the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of 
state power. When a State exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it is insulated 
from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an 
instrument for circumventing a federally protected right”).
138 See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 104.
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congressional power:
Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right 
is. It has been given the power to enforce, not the power to determine what 
constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would 
be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the provisions of 
[the Fourteenth Amendment].  While the line between measures that 
remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a 
substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and   
Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the 
distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may 
become substantive in operation and effect. History and our case law 
support drawing the distinction, one apparent from the text of the 
Amendment.139
Because the scope of the Voting Rights Act is often ambiguous, the Circuits have been divided 
in some important areas of election law.140
Congress originally enacted the Voting Rights Act, under its enforcement powers, to 
eliminate discriminatory practices based on race.141  As the Supreme Court stated in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach:142
The Voting Rights Act was designed by Congress to banish the blight of 
racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in 
parts of our country for nearly a century. The Act creates stringent new 
remedies for voting discrimination where it persists on a pervasive scale, 
and in addition the statute strengthens existing remedies for pockets of 
voting discrimination elsewhere in the country. Congress assumed the 
power to prescribe these remedies from § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, 
which authorizes the National Legislature to effectuate by “appropriate”
139 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997).
140 See Johnson  v. Governor of Florida, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5945 (finding that whether Section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act applies to felon disenfranchisement provisions has divided the Circuits); 
e.g., cf., Muntaqim, 366 F.3d 102 (deciding that Section 2 did not reach New York’s felon 
disenfranchisement statute) with Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003) (deciding 
that Section 2 applied to Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law).
141 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966); see Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 
538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (“Congress may enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes 
facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct”).
142 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301.
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measures the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in 
voting.143
But because many states continued to enact discriminatory practices under the auspices of 
neutrality with respect to race, “[i]n 1982, Congress amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to 
make clear that certain practices and procedures that result in the denial or abridgment of the 
right to vote are forbidden even though the absence of proof of discriminatory intent protects 
them from constitutional challenge.”144 Thus, the 1982 amendments relieved “plaintiffs of the 
burden of proving discriminatory intent,”145 even though a plurality of the Supreme Court had 
held in City of Mobile v. Bolden that the Voting Rights Act and Fifteenth Amendment had an 
intent/purpose requirement.146  However, even as amended, “Section 2 does not prohibit all 
voting restrictions that may have a racially disproportionate effect,”147 and just because intent 
does not need to be shown, does not mean that disparate impact alone is always enough.148
Today, it certainly appears that a “state practice could survive Equal Protection Clause 
scrutiny but fail Section 2 Voting Rights Act scrutiny.”149 Thus, it is an attractive platform for 
challenging the use of different machines, should the equal protection argument fail.
A VOTING RIGHTS ACT CHALLENGE: WHY NOW?
143 Id. at 308.
144 Chisom, 501 U.S. at 384; see also 42 USCS § 1973 (2005).
145 Chisom, 501 U.S. at 403.
146 See Bolden, 446 U.S. 55.
147 Johnson  v. Governor of Florida, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5945; see Chisom, 501 U.S. at 383 
(1991) (“certain practices and procedures that result in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote 
are forbidden”).  
148
 The vote dilution cases that used the Zimmer factors were not looking for outright intent, but they 
were looking for something more than just a disparate impact when looking at the Zimmer factors 
and the totality of the circumstances.  This suggests that the Court’s history indicates there might be a 
need to show something more than disparate impact.  See Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th
Cir. 1973).  
149 Johnson  v. Governor of Florida, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5945.
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As we approach the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1982 amendments to the Voting 
Rights Act, the most obvious question raised by the possibility of a challenge to disparate voting 
machines is: Why now? The courts have been particularly skeptical as to whether a challenge 
falls outside the scope of congressional intent when the challenged practice was in place at the 
time of the Voting Rights Act’s enactment, no specific mention of the practice was made at the 
time of enactment, and no challenge was brought immediately after the Act was passed;150 after 
all, the use of different voting machines has been commonplace over the last century, if this 
practice was in violation of the Voting Rights Act, then why have not more challenges been 
brought? There are two answers to this question:  First, the Voting Rights Act has been used 
before to challenge problems with voting technology, but the cases have usually garnered little 
attention and been focused on a small geographic area.151  Second, many of the problems now 
associated with voting technology have come to light since the 2000 election and with 
advancements in technology.152 Of course, these two answers are not unconnected; ironically, 
challenges to voting technology under the Voting Rights Act could not succeed on a large-scale 
until the technology and modeling were in place to properly review and understand the 
150 Id. (discussing the role that the Voting Rights Act should play in the court’s review of felon 
disenfranchisement laws in Florida, since construing the Act to invalidate felon disenfranchisement 
laws might be “clearly contrary to Congressional intent”).
151 See, e.g., Roberts v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1989).
152 See Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan, & Richard Pildes, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 311 (2nd ed., 2002); see also “The Problem: Variations In 
Voting Technology,” infra.
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deficiencies of the system.153  Now that the courts can “identify and remedy the burdens,” a 
challenge under the Voting Rights Act is more likely to succeed.154
ANATOMY OF A CHALLENGE TO DISPARATE VOTING 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
“The essence of a claim under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973, 
is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions 
to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their 
preferred representatives.”155  When scrutinizing a voting practice, courts generally look to the 
“non-exclusive list of factors relevant to a claim under § 2” which were codified in the Voting 
Rights Act: 
[T]he history of official voting-related discrimination in the political 
subdivision; the extent to which voting is racially polarized; the extent to 
which the political subdivision has used electoral practices that tend to 
enhance the opportunity for discrimination; whether minorities have been 
excluded from any candidate slating process; the extent to which minority 
groups bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, 
employment and health; the extent to which political campaigns have been 
characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; the extent to which minority 
members have been elected to public office; whether there is a significant 
lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized 
needs of minority groups; whether the policy underlying the use of such 
voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or 
153
 Even though this conclusion may seem ironic, it is not unlike what has occurred in recent 
gerrymandering cases.  As technology for finding inequality has emerged, the standards have gotten 
more stringent.  See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 327 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Technology is both a threat 
and a promise. On the one hand, if courts refuse to entertain any claims of partisan gerrymandering, 
the temptation to use partisan favoritism in districting in an unconstitutional manner will grow. On 
the other hand, these new technologies may produce new methods of analysis that make more 
evident the precise nature of the burdens gerrymanders impose on the representational rights of 
voters and parties. That would facilitate court efforts to identify and remedy the burdens, with 
judicial intervention limited by the derived standards”).
154 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 327 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986); see Roberts v. Wamser, 679 F. Supp. 1513, 1528 
(E.D. Mo. 1987) (looking at whether the punch card voting system denies blacks an equal 
opportunity for participation in St. Louis).
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procedure is tenuous.”156
A plaintiff must show that there is a disparate impact on minority voters, but a disparate impact 
alone, is not enough.  In order to challenge a voting practice under “Section 2[,] plaintiffs must 
show a causal connection between the challenged voting practice and the prohibited 
discriminatory result.”157  In cases where the “causal connection” is glaring, the court does not 
need to pay as much attention to the codified factors, as is consistent with Congressional intent 
that “intent” not be a factor in Voting Rights Act inquiries:158 The Senate Judiciary Committee 
Report “emphasized . . . that this list of factors was not a mandatory seven-pronged test; the list 
was only meant as a guide to illustrate some of the variables that should be considered by the 
court. As stated in the Report, ‘there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be 
proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the other.’”159  Thus, any suggestion that a 
challenge to disparate voting mechanisms does not fit perfectly into the Act’s “factors” is 
rebutted by the strong “causal connection” that can be shown using the vast amount of data on 
the disparate impact.
As this article described above, political scientists have demonstrated that minorities are 
disproportionately affected by the disparities in voting machines, and that in any given election 
minority voters are having their votes discounted at a much higher rate than white voters.160
156 Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office of the City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 
309-10 (3d Cir. 1994); see Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (“this list of typical factors is neither 
comprehensive nor exclusive”).
157 Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 312; see Farrakhan, 359 F.3d at 1117-19 (citing Ortiz and discussing the 
different Circuits’ treatment of this “causal connection” inquiry).
158 See Farrakhan, 359 F.3d 1116.
159 Gomez v. Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407, 1412 (9th Cir. 1988).
160
 Perhaps one of the advantages of bringing this claim under the Equal Protection Clause, as 
opposed to the Voting Rights Act, is that in more homogeneous states a claim under the Voting 
Rights Act might fail.  Without a racial disparate impact, the Voting Rights Act claim would likely 
be dismissed on the pleadings.
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Thus a finding of disparate impact is certainly supported;161 and there is a “causal connection”
between the use of disparate voting technologies and the disproportionate discounting of 
minority votes.  Minority voters have their votes discounted disproportionately because they 
disproportionately reside in precincts using the worst machinery;162 were the machines 
standardized, the disparate impact would disappear. Although no one could blame the machines 
for the geographical polarization that has led to the disparate impact in discounted votes; 
geographic homogeneity is the result of centuries of discriminatory social, economic, 
governmental, private, and political practices that are deeply connected with the history of racial 
bigotry in the United States.  Because the use of different machinery by geography “interacts 
with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality,” the practice violates the Voting 
Rights Act.163
PART V. SUBSEQUENT USE OF BUSH V. GORE IN THE COURTS
In the four years that have past since Bush v. Gore,164 a number of suits challenging 
voting practices and the adequacy of voting machines have been filed in state and federal 
161 See “The Problem Revisited: Where the Worst Machines are Found and an Argument for 
Heightened Scrutiny,” infra.
162
 There is also some very undeveloped political and social science data suggesting that certain 
machines even disproportionately impact Black voters when there is standardization because Blacks 
tend to undervote/overvote by accident at a slightly greater rate than Whites when the machinery is 
held constant.  Although this paper has not sought to answer what possible changes should be made 
beyond standardization, and standardization would help remedy the overall discrepancy greatly, this 
area of research’s applicability to a judicial challenge should be explored further in the future.   See
Michael Tomz & Robert P. Van Houweling, How Does Voting Equipment Affect the Racial Gap in 
Voided Ballots?, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Vol. 47, No. 1. (Jan. 2003).
163 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47.
164
 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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courts.165  Although many of these suits are quoted in this article and the arguments presented in 
this article reflect their contributions to the caselaw, a few of these decisions are more explicitly 
discussed in this section.  As is true of many of the Court’s decisions based on elections and 
voting rights law, the lower courts have struggled to apply Bush v. Gore’s amorphous 
language,166 but as this PART demonstrates, their reliance on Bush in examining voting 
mechanisms is significant in itself.
BLACK v. MCGUFFAGE
In Black v. McGuffage, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, scrutinized a 
motion to dismiss in a suit seeking an injunction that challenged the use of punch card ballots 
and the variation of voting systems at the county level, and examined “whether a state may allow 
the use of different types of voting equipment with substantially different levels of accuracy, or if 
such a system violates equal protection.”167  The plaintiffs, who were “Latino and African 
American voters in counties throughout Illinois,” alleged that minorities were 
“disproportionately forced to use--and are disproportionately injured when they use--the 
challenged voting systems.”168  Although the litigation did not ultimately play out in the courts 
because the suit was settled after the motion to dismiss failed, the District Court’s discussion of 
the motion is revealing.169
165 Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (finding that “[i]n the wake of the 2000 presidential election, several 
suits, including the present action, were filed challenging the use of punch card ballots as violative of 
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and/or the Due Process Clause. 
Additionally, voters filed suits leading up to the 2004 presidential election challenging the adequacy 
of the voting systems that replaced the punch card ballots).
166 See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279 (“Nor can it be said that the lower courts have, over 18 years, 
succeeded in shaping the standard that this Court was initially unable to enunciate”).
167 McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 898.
168 Id. at 891.
169 Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at n.8 (noting that Black v. McGuffage “was subsequently settled by the 
parties”).
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The Court denied the Defendants’ motion with respect to the claims under the Voting 
Rights Act, Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause, and only dismissed the count 
based on the privileges and immunities clause.170  Quoting Bush v. Gore, and analogizing to the 
human ballot counting in Florida, the court found:
That people in different counties have significantly different probabilities of 
having their votes counted, solely because of the nature of the system used 
in their jurisdiction is the heart of the problem. Whether the counter is a 
human being looking for hanging chads in a recount, or a machine trying to 
read ballots in a first count, the lack of a uniform standard of voting results 
in voters being treated arbitrarily in the likelihood of their votes being 
counted. The State, through the selection and allowance of voting systems 
with greatly varying accuracy rates “value[s] one person’s vote over that of 
another,” even if it does not know the faces of those people whose votes get 
valued less. This system does not afford the “equal dignity owed to each 
voter.” When the allegedly arbitrary system also results in a greater 
negative impact on groups defined by traditionally suspect criteria, there is 
cause for serious concern.171
Not only did the court treat Bush v. Gore as precedential, but it also found that the harm 
in Bush went beyond an expressive harm, and directly implicated the use of varying voting 
technology that created different probabilities that one’s vote would be counted.  The court 
explicitly found that by demonstrating a “disproportionate risk of having their votes not counted”
the plaintiffs had established an injury and thus had standing.172 Furthermore, the court found 
that because this probabilistic injury impacted traditionally protected groups, the injury was 
constitutionally problematic.  Thus, Black v. McGuffage strongly suggests that Bush can be used
to challenge the use of disparate voting technology  under a number of constitutional provisions.
COMMON CAUSE v. JONES 
In Common Cause v. Jones, the court denied the state’s motion for judgment on the 
170 McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 889.
171 Id. at 899 (quoting Bush v. Gore, 431 U.S. at 104-05).
172 Id. at 894 (“Probabilistic injury is enough injury in fact to confer standing in the undemanding 
U.S. Const. art. III sense”).
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pleadings after the plaintiffs challenged California’s use of the less reliable punch card ballots 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and Voting Rights Act.173  In looking at the Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge in Jones, the court looked at previous decisions by the Supreme Court to 
try and find the correct level of scrutiny that should be applied.  Ignoring the Court’s instruction
that Bush should not hold precedential weight, t he District Court found significance in the 
Supreme Court’s citation of Harper in Bush because that case adopted a “standard of at least 
intermediate, and possible, strict scrutiny.”174 In looking at Bush, th e court was unsure which 
level of scrutiny the Court had applied and found “that perhaps the Court was using a heightened 
standard of scrutiny but also was finding the Florida recounts to be arbitrary and 
discriminatory.”175 Thus, based partially on Bush, t he court found that the plaintiffs “alleged 
facts indicating that the Secretary of State’s permission to counties to adopt either punch-card 
voting procedures or more reliable voting procedures is unreasonable and discriminatory.”176
The Fourteenth Amendment challenge was allowed to move forward.
With regard to the Voting Rights Act challenge, the state argued that because the claim 
did not fit the Gingles factors, it should be denied.177  However, the court rejected this argument, 
finding that the Gingles factors apply to “apply to redistricting and vote dilution cases,” and that 
a challenge based on the disparate impact of voting machines is more analogous to a voting 
173
 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
174 Common Cause I, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1109; see Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 
U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
175 Common Cause I, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1109.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1110 (“the three part test articulated in Thornburg v. Gingles: 1) the minority group is 
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in single-member district; 2) 
the minority group is politically cohesive; and 3) the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to 
enable it usually to defeat the minoritys preferred candidate”).
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qualifications challenge and thus the test outlined in Gingles does not apply.178  The court was 
convinced that arguments should proceed with regard to the Voting Rights Act and Fourteenth 
Amendment claims.
Unfortunately, “[t]he issues in this case were subsequently rendered moot because the 
Secretary decertified punch card ballots” for use in elections occurring after March 2004.179
However, due to the campaign to recall Governor Gray Davis in the summer of 2003, the battle 
over California’s voting mechanisms was anything but moot.180
SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT v. SHELLEY
In Southwest Voter Registration Education Project v. Shelley, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en 
banc, would not allow a preliminary injunction based on the California’s use of different voting 
mechanisms in the upcoming gubernatorial recall election of 2003.181  A circuit panel, relying 
heavily on Bush, had previously found that the election should be postponed because the “choice 
between holding a hurried, constitutionally infirm election and one held a short time later that 
assures voters that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are 
satisfied is clear.”182  The plaintiffs based their challenge on the equal protection clause and the 
Voting Rights Act, and a circuit panel noted that they were likely to succeed on the “merits of 
their equal protection claims.”183
The Ninth Circuit quoted Bush and held that because the question in Bush did not 
implicate “whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different 
178 Id.
179 Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at n.10.
180 See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2003).
181 Id.
182 Id. at 912.
183 Id. at 907.
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systems for implementing elections” an injunction was not appropriate because the plaintiffs had 
not shown that there was a high likelihood of success that their challenge would ultimately 
succeed.184  After all, in determining whether to impose an injunction, the standard of review 
requires that the court speculate as to the likelihood that the plaintiffs will ultimately succeed in 
their action.185  However, the Ninth Circuit did not say that there was not a constitutional 
violation,186 or that machinery was not implicated in Bush, just “that plaintiffs will suffer no 
hardship that outweighs the stake of the State of California and its citizens in having this election 
go forward as planned and as required by the California Constitution.”187  In other words, in the 
face of potential competing constitutional interests, the Ninth Circuit erred on the side of 
allowing the election to proceed.188  The decision certainly did not foreclose future challenges to 
the use of disparate voting technologies; in fact, the court hints that if the evidence of disparate 
impact had been further developed at the time of litigation, a Voting Rights Act claim might 
184 Id. at 918.
185 Id. at 917-18 (finding that “[a] preliminary injunction is appropriate where plaintiffs demonstrate 
either: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury; or (2) that 
serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in their 
favor. The district court must also consider whether the public interest favors issuance of the 
injunction. This alternative test for injunctive relief has also been formulated as follows: a plaintiff is 
required to establish (1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable 
injury to plaintiffs if preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring the 
plaintiffs, and (4) advancement of the public interest (in certain cases). This analysis creates a 
continuum: the less certain the district court is of the likelihood of success on the merits, the more 
plaintiffs must convince the district court that the public interest and balance of hardships tip in their 
favor”).
186 Id. at 918 (finding “[t]here is no doubt that the right to vote is fundamental, but a federal court 
cannot lightly interfere with or enjoin a state election. The decision to enjoin an impending election is 
so serious that the United States Supreme Court has allowed elections to go forward even in the face 
of an undisputed constitutional violation” and citing Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 113, 115 (1971); 
Whitcomb, 396 U.S. 1055; Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 121 (1967) (per curiam)).
187 Id. at 920.
188 Id. at 918 (holding that “[i]f the recall election scheduled for October 7, 2003, is enjoined, it is 
certain that the state of California and its citizens will suffer material hardship by virtue of the 
enormous resources already invested in reliance on the election’s proceeding on the announced 
date”).
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have succeeded,189 and that Bush leaves open the question of whether an equal protection 
challenge to the use of the machines would succeed.190
WEBER v. SHELLEY
In another case in the Ninth Circuit, Weber v. Shelley,191 the plaintiff argued that a “lack 
of a voter-verified paper trail in the Sequoia Voting Systems AVC Edge Touchscreen Voting 
System that [Riverside] county installed violate[d] her rights to equal protection and due 
process” because that system was more prone to fraud.192  In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument 
the Ninth Circuit applied a low level of scrutiny because their use was nondiscriminatory and 
had only a minor impact on the right to vote.  Quoting Burdick, the court found:
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh the 
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the 
precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden 
imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those 
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights. Under this 
standard, the rigorousness of the court’s inquiry into the propriety of a state 
election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation 
burdens Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus, has been recognized when 
those rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the regulation must be 
narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. But 
when a state election law provision imposes only reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the Fourteenth Amendment rights of 
voters, the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to 
justify the restrictions.193
Weber can be distinguished from the type of challenge recommended in this article in two 
ways: First, no racial disparate impact was shown.  The analysis in this article has suggested that 
189 Id. at 919 (“There is significant dispute in the record, however, as to the degree and significance 
of the disparity. Thus, although plaintiffs have shown a possibility of success on the merits, we 
cannot say that at this stage they have shown a strong likelihood”).
190 Id. at 918.
191 Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003).
192 Id. at 1103.
193 Id. at 1106.
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when race is implicated the standard of review should be heightened and the protections under 
the Voting Rights Act can be triggered.  Second, Weber was a challenge based on the possibility 
of fraud, not on the possibility that a vote would not be counted.  As was discussed above, there 
are already laws in place to deal with and deter fraud, thus the justification for standardization in 
this case was much weaker than the race-based challenge developed in this article.
STEWART v. BLACKWELL
In Stewart v. Blackwell, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio considered a 
challenge that was more comparable to the one suggested in this article.194 A group of plaintiffs, 
which included African-American voters, challenged the use of punch card voting and “central-
count” optical scanning devices under the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause and the 
Voting Rights Act.195  After reviewing the post-Bush caselaw, the court determined that rational 
basis review should be applied, and that the “primary thrust of this litigation is an attempt to 
federalize elections by judicial rule or fiat via the invitation to this Court to declare a certain 
voting technology unconstitutional and then fashion a remedy.  This Court declines the 
invitation.”196  Indeed, in the Blackwell decision the court “declines the invitation” for some 
extremely foolish reasons and the decision reads like a long excuse.
First, the court denied the Voting Rights Act claim because the plaintiffs only asserted a 
“vote denial” claim and neglected to assert a “vote dilution” claim.197 While implying that the 
vote dilution claim might have succeeded, the court dismisses any potential for success under the 
194 Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. (finding “[t]here are two separate and distinct theories under which a plaintiff can assert a 
claim under the Act, vote denial and vote dilution” and citing Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994)).
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Voting Rights Act because the plaintiffs failed to call their challenge a “vote denial” claim.198
The court quickly notes that there certainly is no vote denial because minorities have not been 
denied access to the polls.199  This seems like an excuse so that the court did not have to consider 
what was obviously meant to be a vote dilution claim.
Second, the court finds that the “operation of different voting systems by different 
counties within the same state does not amount to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”200
In making this finding, the court cites Bush v. Gore, but cites Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion, 
not the majority.201  It seems strange that the court would rely so heavily on the dissenting 
opinion of a case that was not even supposed to have precedential value.
Finally, in assessing where race fits into the challenge, the court considered a variety of 
conflicting social science studies and concluded that “the highest frequency in Ohio of residual 
voting bears a direct relationship to economic and educational factors,” not race.202  However, 
the court fails to recognize that even though race did not match up perfectly with the numbers on
residual votes, the strong correlation between race and economic/educational, suggests that race 
is implicated by the studies.  Racial inequality, facilitated by economic/educational inequality, is 
exactly the type of social and historical inequality that the Voting Rights Act was meant to 
address.  The court selected the study that would make it easiest to decline the invitation and then 
applied an extremely narrow interpretation of the Voting Rights Act.203
198 See id.
199 Id.
200 See id.
201 Id. (citing Bush, 531 U.S. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
202 Id.
203 Cf. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 403 (finding Voting Rights Act should be “interpreted in a manner that 
provides the broadest possible scope”).
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CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM LITIGATION AFTER BUSH v. GORE
This small survey of the cases that have most closely considered the arguments presented 
in this article provides little guidance as to how the Supreme Court would come out were it to 
examine the constitutionality of the variation in voting technology.204 Because these types of 
cases are politically motivated and are either settled or dismissed without an opportunity for 
appeal prior to the certification of the next election, they have not been litigated to their fullest 
potential.205 However, there is one very significant common thread throughout these cases:  
Each of these cases cites and relies heavily on Bush v. Gore and each court believes that Bush
applies to voting machines in some fashion.  Even if this survey of cases does not convincingly 
support an interpretation of Bush in favor of standardization, it certainly suggests that the 
Supreme Court needs to revisit its confusing analysis in Bush, because any prior expectation that 
the lower courts will not look for meaning in its language, has been shattered at this point.  Any 
desire that the language of Bush v. Gore be limited to the 2000 election or any specific type of 
voting rights challenge seems to have been overridden by the large amount of litigation in the 
aftermath of Bush v. Gore in all areas of election law.  As the Dean of Stanford Law, Kathleen 
Sullivan, stated “[Bush v. Gore was] an invitation to lawyers across the country to bring an 
avalanche of lawsuits claiming that [counting] people’s votes differently and with different rates 
of error in different counties violates the equal protection clause.”206  Many scholars believe that 
the lasting legacy of Bush v. Gore will be its “reinvigoration” of voting rights law:
The lasting significance of Bush v. Gore is likely to be the reinvigoration of 
the line of cases from the 1960’s that deemed voting a fundamental right. 
The court’s language has now opened the door for constitutional challenges 
204 See Smith, supra note 78 (detailing some of the initial challenges to voting machines immediately 
after the 2000 election that arose out of Bush v. Gore).
205 See Garrett, supra note 80, at 265 (discussing the use of lawsuits as “political weapons”).
206
 Smith, supra note 78.
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of flawed election methods. The spotlight on Florida revealed just how 
infirm the operations of elections are. The legacy of this case could be a 
substantial jolt of justice into the voting arena.207
PART VI. BUSH, BROWN AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM “ALL DELIBERATE SPEED”
PART VI presents two significant parallels between Brown v. Board of Education and 
Bush v. Gore that are not explored in the literature discussing these two landmark decisions.208
First, in both cases, the Court was forced to review two separate systems that seemed facially 
equal with regard to the broad purposes of the systems, getting an education and placing a vote, 
when in reality the impact of the systems seriously infringed upon the ends of that purpose.  
Second, in each case, the Court recognized state action as unconstitutional, but provided weak 
language that created little impetus for change.  These two parallels are considered here because 
the Court has an opportunity to learn from its mistakes in Brown, in remedying the constitutional 
problems associated with voting technology presented in this article.  Although this article does 
not attempt to rehash the long and complicated history of school desegregation/integration,209 the 
lessons of Brown and school desegregation should not be ignored, lest the judicial system repeat 
its mistakes.  
BACKGROUND ON BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
In 1954, the Court handed down what scholars consider the most important civil rights 
207
 Samuel Issacharoff, “The Court’s Legacy for Voting Rights,” N.Y. TIMES, at A39 (Dec. 14, 
2000).
208
 In making the comparisons between voting rights and education, it is worth noting that some 
courts have been reluctant to “extend the education line of cases to other areas,” especially when 
there is specific precedent in the area of law.  See Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 2005 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 5945 (discussing the 11th Circuit’s reluctance to extend the standards in the education cases to 
felon disenfranchisement laws since “there is specific precedent from this court and the Supreme 
Court dealing with criminal disenfranchisement”).
209
 For this type of discussion, see James L. Hunt, Brown v. Board of Education After Fifty Years: 
Context and Synopsis, 52 MERCER L. REV. 549 (2001); Karl A. Cole-Frieman, A Retrospective of 
Brown v. Board of Education: The Ghosts of Segregation Still Haunt Topeka, Kansas: A Case Study 
on the Role of the Federal Courts in School Desegregation, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1996).
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decision in American history,210 Brown v. Board of Education.211 Brown decided a collection of 
challenges to school segregation based on race.  Relying on strong social science data, the Court 
found that although the schools had similar buildings, curricula, qualifications, and teacher 
salaries, the doctrine of “separate, but equal” had no place in the public school system:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a 
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it 
has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually 
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of 
inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the 
sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and 
mental development of negro children and to deprive  them of some of the 
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.212
The Court would eventually extend its reasoning in Brown to other areas of segregation and the 
unanimous decision in Brown would change the nation.
SEPARATE BUT UNEQUAL
Although not exactly state sanctioned segregation of the kind that existed in the public 
schools before Brown, the variation in voting technology today is similar.  Recognizing that 
neighborhoods in America today are still extremely segregated, a parallel could be made between 
the school system of the first half of the 20th century and voting machines today.  
Looking at the broad entitlement implicated in Brown, the states argued that there was an 
equal right to receiving an education.  Furthermore, they were able to demonstrate that if the 
doctrine of “separate, but equal” manifested itself in the educational system correctly, the 
tangible outcome of receiving a quality public school education would result.  Similarly, in the 
case of voting, all voting technology provides an opportunity to cast one’s vote in the broadest 
210 See Christopher P. Banks, Symposium Article: The Constitutional Politics of Interpreting Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 425, 440 (2003) (finding that Brown is “arguably 
[the Court’s] most important civil rights ruling”).
211
 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
212 Id. at 494.
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sense.  One can cast a vote no matter what machine is used, and if the machinery works perfectly 
there is really no difference between machines.  However, the problem is that separate is 
inherently unequal, because the chance of failure, whether in an education system or voting 
machine, is not equal once there is a separation.  This is the takeaway from Brown.
Unlike school segregation cases, where the Court had to look to social science data in 
order to find qualities “incapable of objective measurement,” that were being provided unequally 
by the segregated schools,213 in the case of voting machines, social science has provided 
conclusive evidence that machines are creating inequality in voting.  On tangible factors alone, 
inequality can be demonstrated.  Combining this with the large body of literature demonstrating 
the somewhat intangible affect of minority vote dilution on political influence, it is easy to see 
how the current system of voting machines is inherently unequal.
LESSONS FROM “ALL DELIBERATE SPEED”
In Brown, the Court overruled the “separate, but equal” doctrine214 which had buttressed 
segregated schools throughout the United States, and without providing a decree for immediate 
desegregation, left it to the lower courts and state government to implement the process.215
However, the Southern states did little to implement the Court’s changes, the courts refused to 
strengthen the decision without further guidance from the Supreme Court, and ultimately 
213 Id. at 493.
214 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (announcing the “separate but equal” doctrine).
215 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495 (“Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we 
hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by 
reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment”).
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“stagnation resulted.”216  As a result, Brown returned to the Supreme Court in 1955 for the Court 
to decide how its first decision should be implemented.  Faced with unwilling state governments 
and a divided nation, the Court wrote in Brown II that the States, through the enforcement of the 
District Courts, must desegregate with “all deliberate speed.”217
A few years later, in Cooper v. Aaron,218 after the Governor and the legislature of 
Arkansas defied the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown I, the Court affirmed its authority, and 
forced Arkansas’ schools to desegregate.  However, the decision in Cooper and the subsequent 
history of school desegregation are a testament to the failure of the “all deliberate speed” “order”
from the Court.  Indeed, ten years after Brown I, “few schools were even marginally 
integrated.”219  It was not until Green v. County School Board,220 that the Court actually said that 
its decision in Brown required integration and had “teeth,” and it took two more decisions in 
1969 and 1970, Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education221 and Carter v. West Feliciana 
Parish,222 to make it clear to the States that the Court meant what it said when it came to 
desegregation and integration.223
Today, the Brown II “all deliberate speed” order is considered one of the greatest failures 
of the Court during the civil rights era: “Both at the time of the decision and in subsequent 
216
 Charles L. Zelden, From Rights to Resources: The Southern Federal District Courts and the 
Transformation of Civil Rights in Education, 1968-1974, 32 AKRON L. REV. 471, 471 (1999) (finding 
that “[s]outhern opposition to desegregation, combined with a lack of direction from the Supreme 
Court, had left the lower federal courts unwilling, or unable, to demand rapid action. Stagnation 
resulted”).
217 See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
218 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
219
 Zelden, supra note 216, at 471.
220
 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
221
 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
222 396 U.S. 290 (1970).
223
 Zelden, supra note 216, at 486.
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appraisals, Brown II was criticized for delegating too much authority to the district courts and 
relying unduly on state and local authorities.”224  In the face of a constitutional violation, the 
Court bowed to State governments that did not want to desegregate, and failed to create a 
timeframe that would counter the “massive resistance” to desegregation around the country.225
After all, if segregation was unconstitutional, it did not follow that the Court would allow it to 
continue for any time period.  The “all deliberate speed” order diminished the seriousness of the 
constitutional violation and allowed the state governments leeway in their remedial efforts.
The Court must have known that its “all deliberate speed” order would not force 
immediate state action.  Politically, given the public opinion of desegregation at the time, 
without a strong order from the Court, state officials were savvy (and potentially motivated by 
animus) in their decision to delay desegregation as long as possible.226  Additionally, given the 
large cost of desegregating, busing students, and revising the entire educational system of a state, 
the officials were constrained by considerations of practicality.
The lesson that can be taken away from the Court’s experiences with desegregation is 
that in the face of a constitutional violation with racial implications, the Court must provide 
language with “bite”  to counteract the strong political, practical, and structural obstacles to 
change.  It is not enough for the Court to recognize a law or policy that is constitutionally 
problematic; in order to seriously catalyze change, the language of the Court must be decisive 
and guiding.
224
 Judith A. Hagley, Massive Resistance: The Rhetoric and the Reality, 27 N.M.L. REV. 167, 182 
(1997).
225 Id.
226 Id. at 186 (finding that politicians were unwilling to support desegregation and whites formed 
groups in the South to actively oppose the process).
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“LIKELY . . . WILL EXAMINE WAYS”227
This is a lesson the Court did not heed in its decision in Bush v. Gore.228  In Bush, the 
Court identified the variation in voting machines and said that “[a]fter the current counting, it is 
likely legislative bodies nationwide will examine ways to improve the mechanisms and 
machinery for voting.”229  There is a strong parallel that can be made between this language and 
the “all deliberate speed” order in Brown.  Both orders provide an ambiguous timeline for the 
States to cure a constitutional violation.
In Bush, the Court indicated, but did not hold, that the use of disparate voting machines is
unconstitutional, and the Court did not immediately force the states to standardize.230 The 
Court’s decision argued that:
The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the 
franchise to choose electors for the President of the United States. Equal 
protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise. Having once granted 
the right to vote on equal terms, the state may not, by later arbitrary and 
disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another. It must be 
remembered that the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or 
dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly 
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.231
As described above, almost any reading of this language suggests that voting machines with 
disparate error rates are unconstitutional.  By counting a vote on a machine that has a high error 
rate in comparison to other machines in the state, a state dilutes the value of that person’s vote, 
thus contradicting the language of this passage.  But the Court did not state outright that the 
States needed to standardize their technology, rather it said the States “will . . . likely” examine 
227 Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (2000).
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 See “PART I. The Problem: Variations in Voting Technology,” supra.
231 Bush, 531 U.S. at 105.
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this issue.
Most likely, the Court was surprised by the vast amount of political science data that was 
presented to them throughout the arguments and briefs in Bush v. Gore on the variation of voting 
machines and its impact on elections.  Because much of the statistical studies of voting machines 
would be close to impossible without computers and a wide network for sharing data across 
states, the nascent research in the area of voting machines became more prominent in the months 
leading up to the 2000 election, and certainly immediately following the election.  Thus, the 
Court may not have considered voting technology as a potential equal protection violation prior 
to its decision in Bush v. Gore.  In Bush, had the Court held outright that the use of varying 
voting machines was unconstitutional, the already forming specter of illegitimacy over the 
presidency in 2000 might have been too much for the country to handle.  The entire election 
system in every state would be invalid, and nationwide challenges under the new doctrine, might 
have forced another election.  Like the Court did almost fifty years earlier in Brown, the Court 
chose the solidarity of a divided nation, and the practicalities of widespread change, over a 
constitutional mandate that would have been difficult to implement immediately.   
Just as the decision in Brown, without a firm mandate, was a “shot over the bow” to the 
states to begin the desegregation process, the language implicating the voting machines in Bush
indicated to the States that they needed to thoroughly examine their voting machines.  Just as the 
change after Brown was mired in state politics, funding issues, and left an impacted class without 
a substantial political influence with nowhere to turn but back to the Courts, changes to voting 
technology in the states have been slow and the states, burdened with large deficits, have 
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struggled to meet the standards recommended to them and those of HAVA.232  If Brown is an 
indicator, the Court will likely be forced to revisit the issues discussed in this article soon, and in 
the face of a constitutional violation, the Court should not tell the States to standardize machines 
with “all deliberate speed,” rather it must provide an ultimatum, mandating change prior to the 
next election.233
PART VII. CONCLUSION
John Hart Ely wrote, “[u]nblocking stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial 
review ought preeminently to be about, and denial of the vote seems the quintessential 
stoppage.”234  As technology advances, new voting technologies will be utilized in American 
elections.  Although these new technologies provide for greater accuracy, faster voting, and 
quicker results, as long as voting machinery is not standardized across a given State, some voters 
will be left behind.  There is significant evidence today that the voters being left behind are 
disproportionately minorities in socio-economically disadvantaged areas.  When the right to vote 
is infringed, and especially when that infringement has racial implications, the courts must step 
in to protect the equal protection rights of those affected.  Under the Equal Protection Clause,
“we have seen the eradication of numerical malapportionment, the enfranchisement of minority 
232
 Camp, supra note 36, at 443 (finding that “many states have failed to undertake ballot reform 
efforts, and . . . some have done so in an incomplete fashion”); see Dan Tokaji, What Voting 
Equipment Will Ohio’s 10 Largest Counties Be Using?, available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/equipment_machines03.html (“When the polls open on 
November 2, 2004, most Ohio voters will find the same voting equipment that they used four years 
ago”).
233 See Camp, supra note 36, at 443 (arguing that “the question of whether Bush itself mandates 
reform will remain significant”).
234
 John Hart Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 117 (1980).  Even though we do not necessarily want 
the Court getting involved in political issues, “[t]he party that controls the process has no incentive to 
change it,” and sometimes it is important for the Courts to step in.  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 327 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).
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voters, and the erosion of discriminatory electoral systems.”235 But just because our electoral 
processes have improved and become more inclusive over the last fifty years, does not mean that 
we cannot do better.  Because the closeness of the 2000 election and subsequent studies of voting 
technology have “brought into sharp focus a common, if heretofore unnoticed, phenomenon,”236
the Court has an opportunity to shape the law and institute change using its equal protection 
jurisprudence.  As we learned from Brown, in the face of a constitutional violation, the Court 
must step in and not sit back and wait for the legislatures to act.  No matter what the cost, it is 
important that we commit the funds necessary to protect the democratic ideals that we purport to 
advance.  If Congress and the legislatures will not, the Court must.
235
 Abner J. Mikva, Justice Brennan and the Political Process: Assessing the Legacy of Baker v. 
Carr, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 686 (1995).
236 Bush, 531 U.S. at 103.
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TABLE 1: UNITED STATES VOTING TECHNOLOGIES237
EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION
Paper Ballots
Candidates’ names are printed next to boxes which voters mark, on 
large ballot forms that are counted manually. Because counting by 
hand is time intensive, these remain in use mostly in small counties 
with few contested offices.
Lever Machines
Each candidate name is assigned to a lever on a rectangular array of 
levers on the face of the machines. The voter pulls down selected 
levers to indicate choices. Interlocks in the machines prevent 
overvoting.
Punch Card
Information about the ballot choices is provided in a booklet 
attached to a mechanical holder and centered over a punch card, 
which is inserted by the voter. To cast a vote, a stylus or other 
punching device provided is used to punch holes at the appropriate 
locations on the card, forcing out the inside of a pre-scored area in 
the shape of a rectangle.
DataVote
In this variation on punch-card ballots, a stapler- like tool creates 
holes on the card with sufficient force that pre-scoring of ballot 
cards is unnecessary. Unlike standard punch card systems, 
information on
candidates and ballot questions is printed directly on the DataVote 
card, so it is easier for voters to ascertain after completing their 
ballot whether they voted as intended.
Optical Scanning238
Large ballots similar to those of paper ballot systems are used, 
allowing information about candidates to be printed directly on the 
ballot. Voters mark their choices using a pen or pencil. Ballots are 
counted by a machine that uses light or infra-red as a sensor to 
discern which oval or rectangle the voter marked from a set of 
choices. Some precinct-based scanning machines are programmed 
to allow voters to check their ballots for overvotes.
Electronic Systems (DRE)
With electronic voting, voter choices directly enter electronic 
storage, using touch screens, push buttons or keyboards. Machines 
are typically programmed to prevent overvoting. The most common 
models are “full faced,” showing all contests at once, like lever 
machines, and a flashing red light alerts voters to the contests in 
which they have not yet voted.
237
 Stephen Knack & Martha Kropf, Invalidated Ballots in the 1996 Presidential Election: A County-
Level Analysis, Working Paper, University of Maryland & University of Missouri, Kansas City (May 
2001), at 8, available at http://unofficial.umkc.edu/kropfm/invalidv.pdf.
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 A great deal of literature has discussed the differences between optical scan machines that tabulate 
at the precinct-level and those that tabulate at a central location.  See, e.g., Mebane, supra note 31, at 
8.
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TABLE 2: RELATIVE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF VOTING TECHNOLOGIES239
TYPE OF MACHINE
POTENTIAL FOR 
ACCIDENTAL 
OVERVOTE
POTENTIAL FOR 
ACCIDENTAL 
UNDERVOTE
COST OF 
CORRECTING A 
MISTAKE
Punch Card High High High
Central Optical Scan Medium Medium Medium
Precinct Optical Scan Low/Medium Low/Medium Medium
Level Low Medium Low
DRE Low Low Low
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in Voided Ballots?, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Vol. 47, No. 1. (Jan. 2003), at 48.
